A structure A = (A; E₀, E₁ , . . . , ${E_{n - 2}}$) is an n-grid if each E i is an equivalence relation on A and whenver X and Y are equivalence classes of, repectively, distinct E i and E j , then X ∩ Y is finite. A coloring χ : A → n is acceptable if whenver X is an equivalence class of E i , then {ϰ Є X: χ(ϰ) = i} is finite. If (...) B is any set, then the n-cube B n = (B n ; E₀ E₁ , . . . , ${E_{n - 2}}$) is considinate axis. Kuratowski [9], generalizing the n = 3 case proved by Sierpiński [17], proved that ℝ n has an acceptable coloring iff ${2^{{N_0}}}$ ≤ ${N_{n - 2}}$. The main result is: of A is a semialgebraic (i.e., first-order definable in the field of reals) n-grid, then the following are equivalent: (1) if A embeds all finite n-cubes, then ${2^{{N_0}}}$ ≤ ${N_{n - 2}}$; if A embeds ℝ n , then ${2^{{N_0}}}$ ≤ ${N_{n - 2}}$; (3) A has an acceptable coloring. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has traditionally focused on a defense of the intrinsic value of animals and wild habitats. However, this ethical project needs to be supplemented by a consideration of the kind of culture that can take such an ethical point of view seriously. This essay argues that one component of an environmentally responsible culture is its domesticated environment. How we construct the domesticated environment has an impact on our perception of our own identities and our relations to wild nature. If (...) we care about wild nature, we must also care about the domesticated environment in which we live our lives. This essay contributes to an ethical reflection on the need to overcome the traditional dualism between domesticated and wild, built and natural that permeates environmental ethical thinking. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

From the late 1790s to the early 1890s, Scottish scholars contributed, as translators, commentators, or critics to the ‘reception’ of Kant's philosophy in Britain. The discussion here considers particularly the work of Richardson, Semple, Gillies, MacVicar, Ferrier, Meiklejohn, and Hastie, and attempts to assess the character, quality, and value of their contributions to Kantian scholarship. An important question throughout is whether – and if so, how far and why – the work of Scottish Kantians can be meaningfully discussed apart from (...) their English contemporaries – one relevant consideration being the distinctive rôle of philosophy in the Scottish M.A. curriculum. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying 'man's estate'. This (...) does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)